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Abstract
Providing meaningful privacy to users of location based services is particularly challenging
when multiple locations are revealed in a short period of time. This is primarily due to the
tremendous degree of dependence that can be anticipated between points. We propose a
Rényi differentially private framework for bounding expected privacy loss for conditionally
dependent data. Additionally, we demonstrate an algorithm for achieving this privacy under
Gaussian process conditional priors. This framework both exemplifies why conditionally
dependent data is so challenging to protect and offers a strategy for preserving privacy to
within a fixed radius for every user location in a trace.
1 Introduction
Location data is acutely sensitive information, detailing where we live, work, eat, shop, worship, and often
when, too. Yet increasingly, location data is being uploaded for smartphone services such as ride hailing and
weather forecasting and then being brokered in a thriving user location aftermarket to advertisers and even
investors [11]. As such, there is a keen need for privacy preserving methods with meaningful guarantees.
However, for virtually any application involving locations that are dependent, like location traces, there are
few results in the privacy literature.
The widely accepted standard of Geo-Indistinguishability (GI) [1] effectively applies differential privacy to
location points and makes use of the Laplace mechanism for sanitizing them. The idea is that a given point in
space enjoys a radius of privacy after noise is added, wherein the radius and degree of privacy are tuneable
parameters. However, like most privacy literature GI is prior agnostic, meaning it ignores any prior dependence
between points in a user’s location trace. Even under weak conditional dependence, the privacy guarantees
begin to quickly dissolve.
A number of existing works have considered the problem setting of aggregate location data and queries. Here,
individual data is protected in a dataset of aggregated location trajectories over a large number of people and
an adversary making aggregate data queries about the dataset [3, 8]. These, however, provide little utility when
applied to a single or a few location traces. Another, more general, line of work such as the median and matrix
mechanisms aim to provide privacy when a series of correlated and aggregate queries are made on the same
database, allowing us to provide prior-agnostic solutions which offer both privacy and utility [9, 6]. These
too, focus on aggregate data and consider protecting against correlated queries, as opposed to correlated data
points.
Other work perhaps closer to our setting is that of inferential privacy such as Pufferfish privacy [5]. More
general works focused on inferential privacy such as [10, 4] fail to address the spatiotemporal aspects of the
problem. Inferential privacy methods more specifically aimed at location trace privacy such as [12, 2], are
either too limiting in their prior distribution, or only consider on-line location data release as opposed to full
trace release.
In this work, we revisit the problem of preserving privacy for a single user’s location trace under the assumption
of a flexible conditional prior. We first lay out a Pufferfish style framework that limits the class of prior
distributions and the discriminative pairs to be protected. We then specify a Rényi differential privacy
measurement [7] of privacy loss, and finally show how to bound this loss under Gaussian assumptions, thus
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preserving privacy to within a specified radius of each point in the trace. Finally, we provide some empirical
examples of how even under weak correlative priors, more noise is needed than would be specified by prior
agnostic approaches such as GI.
2 Preliminaries and Problem Formulation
Without loss of generality, we consider a location trace as d real-valued points. We refer to a d-point location
trace as either a vector in Rd, X = [x1, . . . , xd], or a set of d points in R, X = {x1, . . . , xd}. We will use
these two definitions interchangeably depending on the context. Similarly, we refer to the d-point privatized
version of X,X as Z,Z , existing in the same instance space. A mechanism M privatizes each xi ∈ X to
its corresponding zi ∈ Z as i s depicted in the graphical model of Figure 1a . For a more realistic 2- or
3-dimensional application, either the dimensions may be deemed independent and privatized separately, or be
linked through techniques like co-krigging.
x1
z1
x2
z2
x3
z3
x4
z4
(a)
S,S
Zs,Zs
U,U
Zu,Zu
(b)
Figure 1: (a) An example graphical model of a four point trace X ∈ R4. (b) The more general grouped version of the
model in (a), where the secret set S = {x1, x3}, the remaining set U = {x3, x4}, and the obfuscated Zu, Zs are shown.
In the same fashion as GI, we aim to provide privacy to within a radius r for each real-valued location point
xi ∈ X . However, existing location privacy notions like GI consider a mechanism M(X) = Z sufficient if
each zi ∈ Z does not relate where its corresponding xi ∈ X is within some radius r. In this work we motivate
the need for a more strict notion of location privacy that requires each zi to not only protect its corresponding
xi, but what might be implied about the remaining X\xi. Additionally, M must privatize subsequences
of points S ∈ X by ensuring the released subsequence Zs ∈ Z does not relate where S or the remaining
(complement) subsequence points U = X\S are within radius r.
To formalize what we mean by S ‘implying’ something about U , we mean that it significantly affects the
conditional probability P (U|S). We ask that any privacy preserving mechanism be private to some class of
‘conditional priors’.
Definition 2.1. A class of conditional priors specifies a set, D, of conditional prior distributions, θ ∈ D, that
define the probability of any subsequence of location points U ∈ X conditioned on the remaining points
S = X\U : P (U = u|S = s, θ).
It is important to note that specifying the class of conditional priors still leaves a large class of marginal priors
P (X = x|θ). For example, a Gaussian conditional prior does not require a Gaussian marginal prior.
To see the importance of subsequence privacy, consider a 3-point trace, X3 = {x1, x2, x3}, and its privatized
trace Z . We reason about the odds of the points being in the locations xdaycare, xwork which are within r of each
other. Frameworks like GI assume independence of each xi ∈ X , and then bound the odds of any zi given xi
is at xdaycare versus xwork. However, if the xi’s are interdependent (and likely are) this may not be the case.
Reasoning about S = {x1, x3} and U = X\S = {x2}, a mechanism satisfying GI does not bound the odds
of Z given x1 = xdaycare ∩ x3 = xwork versus x1 = xwork ∩ x3 = xdaycare. Depending on the conditional prior
θ ∈ D, these two orders of events may have very different implications about the location of x2, and thus z2.
There are two primary distinguishing features about our location privacy framework. First, instead of
individually bounding the odds of P (zi|xi=x
′)
P (zi|xi=x) for pairs of x
′, x hypotheses within r, we bound the odds of
P (Z|S=s′)
P (Z|S=s) for pairs of s
′, s hypotheses such that each hypothesis pair x′i, xi ∈ S are within r. Second, instead
of bounding max divergence as in GI, we opt to bound the λ-th order Rényi divergence for simplicity of
analysis with a wide range of conditional prior classes, D. Recall that, for distributions µ, ν on the same
measurable space, this is defined as Dλ
(
µ
ν
)
= 1λ−1 logEx∼ν
(
µ(x)
ν(x)
)λ
.
2
Borrowing from ‘Pufferfish Privacy’ defined in [5], we guarantee privacy for a specific set of secret pairs of
subsequence value assignments (S = si,S = sj), and for a specific (conditional) prior class D:
Definition 2.2.
[
(, r,D)-Conditional Inferential Privacy (CIP) ] A randomized mechanism M : Rd → Rd
applied to location trace X,X offers subsequence S ⊆ X (, r,D)-CIP provided that
• for all possible outputs Z ∈ Rd
• for all discriminative pairs Spairs = {(si, sj) : ‖si − sj‖∞ ≤ r} for subsequence S ⊆ X
• for all conditional priors θ ∈ D such that P (S = si|θ) 6= 0, P (S = sj |θ) 6= 0 for all discriminative
pairs
Dλ
(
P (Z|S = si, θ)
P (Z|S = sj , θ)
)
≤ 
Where for simplicity we will refer to the events S = si, S = sj , as Si, Sj , respectively.
An interpretation of (, r,D)-CIP compliance for subsequence S is that release Z does not sharpen any
marginal prior (that has a conditional prior in D) by more than  in expectation.
Corollary 1. For two distributions, P (Z|Si, θ), P (Z|Sj , θ), with Rényi Divergence bounded by , we also
know that the expected gap between the prior and posterior log-odds ratios is bounded by .
EZ∼P (Z|Sj ,θ)
[
log
P (Si|Z, θ)
P (Sj |Z, θ) − log
P (Si|θ)
P (Sj |θ)
]
≤ Dλ
(
P (Z|Si, θ)
P (Z|Sj , θ)
)
(1)
≤ 
Returning to the original intention of providing privacy within radius r of each xi ∈ X , we point out that a CIP-
compliant mechanism, M , for subsequence S does not necessarily guarantee this radius to each xi ∈ S . This
is because — without any constraint on D— there may exist another subsequence including xi, S ′ ⊇ {xi},
for which M is not CIP compliant. As such, we assert that achieving true location privacy for point xi in trace
X , requires being CIP compliant for every subsequence containing xi, which is exponential in the number of
points |X |. This exemplifies why privacy for highly dependent data is challenging: the number of ways an
adversary can infer the true value of xi is exponential in the number of points.
In the next section, we demonstrate a CIP compliant mechanism for a Gaussian process conditional prior and
additive Gaussian mechanism.
3 CIP Compliance Under Gaussian Assumptions
3.1 The Privacy Bound for Additive Mechanisms
It is instructive to analyze the privacy loss in the case of an additive noise mechanism, Z ∼M(X) = g +X,
where g ∼ ζ. Using the model depicted in Figure 1, we know that all of the x ∈ X values are fully connected,
and each of the zi ∈ Z values are conditionally independent given their associated xi value. Using this
conditional independence relation, reconsider the Rényi Divergence bound defined in Definition 2.2. Here, the
notation gs, gu correspond to the noise vector g indexed at the S and U points, respectively.
Dλ
(
P (Z|Si, θ)
P (Z|Sj , θ)
)
= Dλ
(
P (Ui + gu)
P (Uj + gu)
)
+
∑
(z,xi,xj)∈(Zs,Si,Sj)
Dλ
(
P (z|xi)
P (z|xj)
)
(2)
where Ui ∼ P (U|Si, θ),Uj ∼ P (U|Sj , θ). (See Appendix for proof)
Here, we see that the divergence separates into two terms: the first for Zu and the second for Zs. The second
is prior agnostic, behaving much more like differential privacy. The first term depends on the conditional
distribution, θ, of the U points on the S points and on the mechanism noise g ∼ ζ.
3.2 CIP for Gaussian Process Data
We now demonstrate a CIP mechanism for the case of a Gaussian process conditional prior class, θ ∈ D,
where a timestamp ti is released for each xi ∈ X . The conditional distribution for any partition of X , P (U|S)
3
is the conditional distribution of a mean zero multivariate normal distribution with some covariance matrix Σ
dictated by some kernel Σij = k(ti, tj).
P (U|S) = N (µu|s,Σu|s)
where µu|s = ΣusΣ−1ss S and Σu|s = Σuu − ΣusΣ−1ss Σsu. The class of covariance matrices, D, includes all
covariance matrices of an RBF kernel with equal variance σ2x and with length scales less than some maximum
length scale l ≤ lmax. For location points with time values t1 and t2, Σij = kRBF(ti, tj) = σ2x exp
(
−(ti−tj)2
2l2
)
.
However, this analysis applies to any kernel. As a first pass, we consider the mechanism of adding mean zero,
equal variance, Gaussian noise to each location point: Z = X+ g and g ∼ N (0, σ2zI).
While X is not necessarily Gaussian distributed, P (Z|Si, θ) = P (Zs,Zu|Si, θ) = P (Zs|Si)P (Ui + gu) is
Gaussian distributed, making the Rényi Divegence in Definition 2.2 easy to analyze. Substituting this fact into
Equation 2, we solve four our privacy loss, Lpriv
Lpriv =
λ
2
[
∆sᵀΣeff∆s+
1
σ2z
‖∆s‖22
]
(3)
where ∆s = (si − sj) and Σeff = (ΣusΣ−1ss )ᵀ(Σu|s + σzI)−1(ΣusΣ−1ss ). (See Appendix for proof)
By Definition 2.2, Spairs requires that ‖∆s‖∞ ≤ r. For simplicity, we show maximum privacy loss for a wider
set discriminative pairs: Spairs = {∆s ∈ R|S| : ‖∆s‖22 ≤ r2|S|}, effectively solving for the worst case privacy
loss in the L2 ball circumscribing the L∞ ball suggested in Definition 2.2.
This allows us to easily maximize the fist term in Equation 3: a Mahalanobis distance maximized by the
eigenvector of Σeff with maximal eigenvalue. The second term, being prior agnostic and only affected by
magnitude of ∆s, will automatically be maximized if the first term is maximized. We denote this worst case
eigenvector discriminative pair ∆s∗, and associated worst case loss as L∗priv, which may be simplified as
L∗priv =
λ
2
(
1 + σ2zα
∗
σ2z
)
|S|r2 (4)
where α∗ is the largest eigenvalue of Σeff. If we choose a σ2z large enough that L
∗
priv ≤ , then the mechanism is
CIP compliant for subsequence S . Furthermore, if the mechanism is CIP compliant for the covariance matrix
with highest correlation induced by l = lmax, then it is CIP compliant for all l < lmax, and thus all θ ∈ D.
Prior agnostic methods like GI, effectively assume all points are independent, and thus Σ = I. To demonstrate,
we compute the maximum privacy loss on a ten point trace for a diagonal ‘GI’ covariance matrix along with a
series of other RBF matrices with different length scales. We observe L∗priv for a subsequence S of every other
point, and see a 50% increase in privacy loss even for l = 1, which assigns a correlation of 0.6 to neighboring
points. See Figure 2 for plots of this privacy loss.
(a) (b)
Figure 2: (a) Worst case privacy loss vs. noise variance, σ2z , added to each xi for a subsequence S of every other point in
X . We show privacy loss of several RBF kernel covariance matrices Σ with different length scales l2. The blue dotted
line shows the privacy loss for points that are assumed independent Σ = I (as in GI), which drastically under-represents
privacy loss against an RBF conditional prior. (b) Here, we show an example location trace, X , and superimpose the worst
case hypothesis on ∆s∗ for an RBF conditional prior θ of length scale l = 2. If an adversary compares S = si with
S = sj = si + ∆s
∗, they will witness a large deviation in the distribution of the remaining points Zu.
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4 Appendix
4.1 Demonstration of Results
Corollary 1. For two distributions, P (Z|Si, θ), P (Z|Sj , θ), with Rényi Divergence bounded by , we also
know that the expected gap between the prior and posterior log-odds ratios is bounded by .
EZ∼P (Z|Sj ,θ)
[
log
P (Si|Z, θ)
P (Sj |Z, θ) − log
P (Si|θ)
P (Sj |θ)
]
≤ Dλ
(
P (Z|Si, θ)
P (Z|Sj , θ)
)
≤ 
Proof.
EZ∼P (Z|Sj ,θ)
[(
P (Z|Si, θ)
P (Z|Sj , θ)
)λ]
= exp
[
(λ− 1)Dλ
(
P (Z|Si, θ)
P (Z|Sj , θ)
)]
(a)
λEZ∼P (Z|Sj ,θ)
[
logP (Z|Si, θ)− logP (Z|Sj , θ)
] ≤ (λ− 1)Dλ(P (Z|Si, θ)
P (Z|Sj , θ)
)
(b)
EZ∼P (Z|Sj ,θ)
[
logP (Z|Si, θ)− logP (Z|Sj , θ)
] ≤ Dλ(P (Z|Si, θ)
P (Z|Sj , θ)
)
(c)
EZ∼P (Z|Sj ,θ)
[
log
P (Si|Z, θ)
P (Sj |Z, θ) − log
P (Si|θ)
P (Sj |θ)
]
≤ Dλ
(
P (Z|Si, θ)
P (Z|Sj , θ)
)
(d)
Step (a) simply uses the definition of Rényi Divergence, which for two distributions µ, ν defined on the same
measurable space, and for order λ > 1 is given by
Dλ
(
µ
ν
)
=
1
λ− 1 logEx∼ν
(
γ(x)
ν(x)
)λ
Step (b) first takes the log of both sides, and then applies Jensen’s Inequality. Step (c) uses the fact that
λ−1
λ < 1 ∀λ > 1. Step (d) simply uses Bayes Rule.
Equation 2.
Dλ
(
P (Z|Si, θ)
P (Z|Sj , θ)
)
= Dλ
(
P (Ui + gu)
P (Uj + gu)
)
+
∑
(z,xi,xj)∈(Zs,Si,Sj)
Dλ
(
P (z|xi)
P (z|xj
)
(2)
Proof.
Dλ
(
P (Z|Si, θ)
P (Z|Sj , θ)
)
= Dλ
(
P (Zs|Si)P (Zu|Si, θ)
P (Zs|Sj)P (Zu|Sj , θ)
)
(a)
Simplify P (Zu|Si, θ) according to the model defined in Figure 1:
P (Zu|Si, θ) =
∫
R|U|
P (Zu,U = u|Si, θ)du
=
∫
R|U|
P (U = u|Si, θ)P (Zu|U = u)du
=
∫
R|U|
P (U = u|Si, θ)P (gu = Zu − u|ζu)du
=
[
P (U|Si, θ) ∗ P (gu|ζu)
]
(Zu)
= P (Ui + gu)
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where Ui ∼ P (U|Si) and gu ∼ ζu. Returning to the divergence calculation at step (a)
Dλ
(
P (Zs|Si)P (Zu|Si, θ)
P (Zs|Sj)P (Zu|Sj , θ)
)
= Dλ
(
P (Zs|Si)P (Ui + gu)
P (Zs|Sj)P (Uj + gu)
)
(b)
= Dλ
(
P (Zs|Si)
P (Zs|Sj)
)
+Dλ
(
P (Ui + gu)
P (Uj + gu)
)
(c)
=
[ ∑
(z,xi,xj)∈(Zs,Si,Sj)
Dλ
(
P (z|xi)
P (z|xj)
)]
+Dλ
(
P (Ui + gu)
P (Uj + gu)
)
(d)
= Dλ
(
P (Ui + gu)
P (Uj + gu)
)
+
∑
(z,xi,xj)∈(Zs,Si,Sj)
Dλ
(
P (z|xi)
P (z|xj)
)
Step (a) uses the conditional independence properties specified in Figure 1. Step (b) substitutes the redefined
distribution of P (Zu|Si, θ) into the divergence. Step (c) is possible because Zs ⊥ Zu|S as specified in Figure
1; this is a property of Rényi Divergence for product distributions. Step (d) separates the first term into |S|
separate terms since, each of the zis are independent conditioned on S, thus separating their Rényi Divergences
into the sum of |S| terms.
Equation 3.
Lpriv =
λ
2
[
∆sᵀΣeff∆s+
1
σ2z
‖∆s‖22
]
(3)
Proof.
Lpriv =Dλ
(
P (Ui + gu)
P (Uj + gu)
)
+
∑
(z,xi,xj)∈(Zs,Si,Sj)
Dλ
(
P (z|xi)
P (z|xj)
)
(a)
=Dλ
(N (µu|si ,Σu|si + σ2zI)
N (µu|sj ,Σu|sj + σ2zI)
)
+
∑
(xi,xj)∈(Si,Sj)
Dλ
(N (xi, σ2z)
N (xi, σ2z)
)
(b)
=
λ
2
(µu|si −µu|sj )ᵀ(Σu|s + σ2zI)−1(µu|si −µu|sj ) +
λ
2σ2z
‖si − sj‖22 (c)
Step (a) is simply a restatement of Equation 2. Step (b) substitutes in the distributions for a Gaussian
conditional prior and Gaussian additive noise mechanism. Step (c) is due to the Rényi Divergence of two
normal distributions with identical covariance, which is the Mahalanobis distance between the conditional
means:
Dλ
(N (µa,Σ)
N (µb,Σ)
)
=
λ
2
(µa −µb)ᵀΣ−1(µa −µb)
In step (c), Σu|s = Σu|si = Σu|sj since Gaussian conditional covariance matrices only depend on which
points are being conditioned on, not their values. Substituting in the values of µu|si = ΣusΣ
−1
ss si and
µu|sj = ΣusΣ
−1
ss sj , which is defined by the Gaussian conditional mean, this expression simplifies nicely. Let
∆s = (si − sj), then the above expression becomes
=
λ
2
[
∆sᵀ(ΣusΣ−1ss )
ᵀ(Σu|s + σ2zI)−1(ΣusΣ−1ss )∆s+
1
σ2z
‖∆s‖22
]
(d)
=
λ
2
[
∆sᵀΣeff∆s+
1
σ2z
‖∆s‖22
]
(e)
where Σeff = (ΣusΣ−1ss )
ᵀ(Σu|s + σ2zI)−1(ΣusΣ−1ss ). One can see that increasing σ2z , reduces the eccentricity
of (Σu|s + σ2zI)−1, and thus reduces the top eigenvalue and the worst case privacy loss. Meanwhile, having a
longer length scale, l, in the kernel increases covariance, and increases the eccentricity of (Σu|s +σ2zI)−1.
Equation 4.
L∗priv =
λ
2
(
1 + σ2zα
∗
σ2z
)
|S|r2 (4)
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Proof.
Lpriv =
λ
2
[
∆sᵀΣeff∆s+
1
σ2z
‖∆s‖22
]
(a)
L∗priv = max
∆s∈∆S
λ
2
[
∆sᵀΣeff∆s+
1
σ2z
‖∆s‖22
]
(b)
=
λ
2
[
∆s∗ᵀΣeff∆s∗ +
1
σ2z
‖∆s∗‖22
]
(c)
=
λ
2
[
α∗‖∆s∗‖22 +
1
σ2z
‖∆s∗‖22
]
(d)
=
λ
2
(
1 + σ2zα
∗
σ2z
)
‖∆s∗‖22 (e)
=
λ
2
(
1 + σ2zα
∗
σ2z
)
|S|r2 (f)
Step (a) is a restatement of Equation 3. Step (b) is a maximization of all discriminative pairs described in
Definition 2.2. Here, the set of all pairs is given by ∆S = {∆s = si − sj : ‖∆s‖22 ≤ |S|r2}. The choice
of |S|r2 as the upper bound on magnitude, is because this includes a radius of r around each xi ∈ S. Step
(c) substitutes in the optimal solution ∆s∗. Step (d) identifies the optimal solution as the maximizer of the
Mahalanobis distance of the first term. Here, α∗ is the top eigenvalue of Σeff. The maximizer ∆s∗ will also
have maximum magnitude, ‖∆s∗‖ = |S|r2, in the direction of the top eigenvector, which is incorporated into
step (f).
8
